Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
T he U.S. tax code provides a number of subsidies for lowcarbon technologies. This paper discusses the diffi culties of achieving key policy goals with subsidies as opposed to using taxes to raise the price of pollution-related activities. In particular, subsidies lower the cost of energy (on average) rather than raising it. Thus, consumer demand responses often work in opposition to the goal of reducing emissions (especially as average cost pricing is used for electricity). Second, it is diffi cult to achieve technology neutrality with subsidies-here defi ned as an equal subsidy cost per ton of CO 2 avoided. Third, many subsidies are inframarginal. Finally, subsidies often suffer from unintended interactions with other policies.
The next section describes current tax policies to support low-carbon energy sources. The third section discusses the issue of technology neutrality and some other problems with a subsidy-based approach to energy policy. The fourth section focuses on taxes versus production tax credits for wind generation, currently the largest recipient of tax subsidies in renewable electricity generation. The paper concludes with some observations on the use of price-based instruments. In particular, there is a discussion of how a carbon tax could be designed to achieve environmental goals of emission caps over a control period.
CURRENT POLICIES
Current tax policy includes a variety of tax preferences for low-carbon technologies. This section discusses the most important preferences. While not especially costly in terms of foregone tax revenue, these preferences have been important in shaping low-carbon energy investment over the past decade.
Electricity Generation
A number of preferences in the tax code support the production of renewable electricity.
1 Section 45 of the Internal Revenue Code 2 provides production tax credits over the fi rst 10 years of electricity generation from wind, biomass, geothermal, municipal solid waste, qualifi ed hydropower, and marine and hydrokinetic energy sources. The credit, originally enacted as part of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, provides a 2.1 cent per kilowatt hour (kWh) credit for production in 2008 over ten years. 3 The credit phases out as the average contract price of electricity exceeds 8 cents per kWh (in $1992)-currently 11. Facilities eligible to receive the production tax credit (or the section 48 investment tax credit discussed below) are also eligible to write off these generation assets over a fi ve-year period. In the absence of this provision, the assets would be written off over a fi fteen-year period. The production tax credit was most recently extended in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA). To qualify, wind projects must be put in place before January 1, 2013; other projects must be put in place before January 1, 2014.
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 added a production tax credit for new nuclear power generation (section 45J). Qualifying plants are eligible for a 1.8 cent per kWh production tax credit up to an annual limit of $125 million per 1,000 megawatts of installed capacity. This limit will be binding for a nuclear power plant with a capacity factor of 80 percent or higher. There is an aggregate limit of 6,000 megawatts of capacity that is eligible for this credit. Qualifying facilities must be placed in service before the end of 2020. To date no new plants have been built, though combined license applications for twenty-six units have been fi led with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
4 Solar powered electricity is eligible for a 30 percent investment tax credit if put in place prior to the end of 2016 (the credit falls to 10 percent after that date). Certain other technologies are also eligible for this credit, including residential solar projects, fuel cells and microturbine power plants, geothermal heat pump property (at a 10 percent rate), wind property with no more than 100 kilowatts (kW) of rated capacity, and certain combined heat and power systems (at 10 percent). In addition, ARRA allowed certain section 45 qualifi ed property to elect a 30 percent investment tax credit in lieu of the 2.1 cent per kWh production tax credit for property put in place before January 1, 2014 (January 1, 2013 for wind). ARRA also provided for an option to elect a cash grant from the Department of Treasury in lieu of the production or investment tax credit for certain section 45 and 48 qualifying investments. The grant covers 30 percent of the cost of the qualifi ed project and in effect extends the investment tax credit to fi rms that otherwise do not have a suffi cient tax appetite 1 For a more detailed description of energy-related tax provisions, see Joint Committee on Taxation (2009 to utilize the credits. This addressed the concern that the fi nancial crisis had dried up a major source of fi nance for the wind industry.
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Other electricity-related provisions include the exclusion of utility sponsored conservation measures from utility customers' taxable income and the credit for holding Clean Renewable Energy Bonds (CREBs). CREBs are designed to encourage the production of renewable electricity from developers that do not pay federal income taxes (e.g., municipal governments and municipally-owned power companies) and would otherwise not be eligible for production or investment tax credits. The Joint Committee on Taxation reports that over 900 projects have received allocations from CREB in 2006 and 2008, with solar projects accounting for nearly two-thirds of the projects and wind nearly one-quarter of the projects (see Table 1 , Joint Committee on Taxation, 2009).
Transportation Fuels
Most of the tax provisions related to transport fuels are focused on reducing the reliance of the transportation sector on petroleum. But some arguably also reduce carbon emissions.
The alternative motor vehicle credit (section 30B) provides investment tax credits for certain fuel cell vehicles, hybrids, plug-in hybrids, and advanced lean burn technology vehicles. Qualifi ed fuel cell vehicles are eligible for base credits ranging from $8,000-$40,000 with additional credits based on fuel economy relative to base fuel economy. Credits for hybrid automobiles and light trucks are determined by a combination of fuel economy and conservation credits, with the maximum possible credit equaling $3,400 based on vehicle characteristics. The credit begins to phase out once the manufacturer's sales of hybrid vehicles reaches 60,000.
6 A similar phase-out exists for the advanced lean burn technology vehicles. Plug-in hybrids become eligible for a base credit of $2,500 for vehicles sold after December 31, 2009 with a supplemental credit of $417 per kWh of battery capacity in excess of four kWhs. The maximum credit ranges from $10,000 -$15,000 depending on vehicle weight. This credit expires at the end of 2014 and is subject to a similar phase out based on sales, as are non-plug in hybrid vehicles.
The Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit (VEETC) currently provides a 45 cent per gallon of ethanol exemption from the motor fuels excise tax. For ethanol blended at a 10 percent rate, this reduces the fuel tax by 4.5 cents per gallon of blended fuel. Whether corn-based ethanol should be viewed as a low-carbon technology is a matter of some controversy.
7 In addition to VEETC, various other credits are provided including a $1.00 per gallon credit for biodiesel and a $0.50 per gallon credit for alternative fuels and alternative fuel mixtures. This latter credit is discussed below.
Effi ciency and Other
A variety of energy effi ciency investment credits exist for nonbusiness (residential) property. A credit equal to 30 5 See discussion in Chadbourne and Parke (2009) . For an assessment of the relative merits of using the production versus the investment tax credit see Bolinger et al. (2009). 6 Once 60,000 vehicles are sold, the credit is reduced by 50 percent in the second calendar quarter following the month in which 60,000 sales are reached. For example, if the 60,000 th vehicle is sold in February, the credit is reduced by 50 percent in July of that year. The credit is reduced by 75 percent of its full amount in the fourth calendar quarter (January of the following year for this example) and is fully phased out in the sixth calendar quarter (July for this example). 7 See, for example, Searchinger et al. (2008) and the responses to this article. percent of the cost of qualifi ed investments (windows, doors, insulation, burners, etc.) up to $1,500 is available for investments through 2010.
8 Manufacturer credits for energy effi cient new homes range from $1,000-$2,000 depending on the effi ciency improvements and are available through 2009. Manufacturer credits for appliances meeting higher effi ciency standards are available through 2010. Manufacturers are limited to maximum claims of $75 million in aggregate, except for the credits on the highest effi ciency clothes washers and refrigerators. An analysis of these subsidies and their relation to larger policy goals follows. In particular, I focus on the potential for using tax subsidies to achieve technology neutrality among energy sources.
Summary of Low-Carbon Energy Tax Benefi ts

TECHNOLOGY NEUTRALITY IN CARBON POLICY
Economic theory provides clear prescriptions for situations where interventions through the tax code can improve social welfare.
10 Externalities provide the most relevant rationale for intervening in the market for energy. If the production or consumption of energy has as a by-product the creation of an externality (e.g., pollution), then social welfare can be improved through government intervention. One way to do this is by taxing the externality. Thus a tax on the sulfur content of fossil fuels, for example, would be an effi cient response to acid rain damages arising from fossil fuel consumption for electricity generation. This is an example of a Pigouvian tax.
11 It "internalizes the externality" by forcing fi rms to take into account the social costs of pollution by raising their private costs by the amount of the social damages that are generated by the pollutant. This approach implicitly makes clear that pollution-generating activities have social benefi ts as well as costs. Optimal policy must balance those costs against the benefi ts; taxation is an effi cient means of achieving that balance.
Rather than taxing activities that create negative externalities, subsidies may be provided to activities that are substitutes for externality-generating activities. Put simply, if fuel X generates pollution damages while fuel Y does not, the price of fuel X relative to fuel Y may be raised to refl ect the social damages from burning fuel X or the price of fuel Y may be reduced. Either approach encourages fi rms to use less of fuel X and more of fuel Y. This is the reasoning that underlies federal energy tax policy. In large measure, we subsidize energy activities that we would like to encourage rather than tax activities that we would like to discourage.
What are the externalities of signifi cant concern that drive federal tax policy towards energy? Two concerns dominate the agenda. First is the concern with global climate change arising from increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Fossil fuel combustion in the United States was responsible for eighty percent of domestic greenhouse gas emissions in 2007 (Environmental Protection Agency, 2009) . Any policy to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions must include, as a key element, incentives to shift from the consumption of fossil fuel to renewable fuels.
A second concern is our heavy reliance on petroleum products and the dominance of this fuel in the transportation sector. In 2007, 70 percent of petroleum products were used by the transportation sector. Conversely, petroleum accounted for over 95 percent of the fuel used in this sector. Our reliance on petroleum makes us vulnerable to economic dislocations from sharply rising oil prices or supply disruptions.
Energy production and consumption are associated with negative externalities in addition to climate change and oil dependence. I do not focus on those here because many of these negative externalities are currently addressed through regulatory means. For example, the Acid Rain Program run by the Environmental Protection Agency has been a highly costeffective response to the damages incurred from the release of sulfur dioxide in fossil fuel electric generation units. Moreover the current set of energy subsidies is arguably focused to a large extent on reducing greenhouse gas emissions and reducing our consumption of oil.
An effi cient energy policy should not favor one energy source over another after taking into account any positive or negative externalities associated with its production or consumption. This is the concept of technology neutrality. If our focus is on global warming due to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, a technology neutral policy would raise the price of emissions per unit of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO 2 e) by the same amount. A comprehensive carbon tax or cap-and-trade system does this.
It is trickier-as we shall see-to achieve technology neutrality when subsidies are used instead of taxes. For the purposes of this analysis, I will measure technology neutrality in terms of the cost of achieving a given amount of carbon dioxide reductions as a result of the subsidy. The benefi t of this approach is that it calibrates the measure of the tax code's impact on the policy goal (reducing greenhouse gas emissions). If the tax subsidy per ton of avoided greenhouse gas emissions from technology X is twice that of reducing emissions from technology Y then we can say that tax policy favors technology X over Y on this dimension.
This defi nition of technology neutrality is not the same as effi ciency in abatement of pollution. The latter requires that the marginal cost of pollution abatement be equalized across energy sources. Unless subsidies are designed in terms of a payment per unit of pollution reduced it is diffi cult, if not impossible, to achieve economic effi ciency across fuel types. Moreover, even if subsidies are constructed in this fashion, it is diffi cult to disentangle true emission reductions from reductions that would have taken place in the absence of the tax subsidy.
Using subsidies within the tax system to achieve energy policy goals has been a time honored custom throughout the history of the U.S. income tax. It is important, however, to recognize the limitations of subsidies in achieving effi cient outcomes. First, note that a subsidy-based approach achieves the important goal of adjusting relative prices of polluting and non-polluting energy sources in the right direction. If fuel source X causes pollution that is equal to 10 percent of its cost, then we can provide the right incentive to fuel users choosing between fuel sources X and Y by raising the price of X by 10 percent or by lowering the cost of fuel source Y by 9.1 percent (1.0 divided by 1.1). Either way the relative cost of fuel source X to Y is now ten percent higher than it was prior to the implementation of the new energy policy. Either a tax or a subsidy can be effective on the margin when choosing among fuel sources where some sources cause pollution.
Subsidies create a problem, however, on a different margin. Effi ciency requires that consumers make decisions taking into account the full cost of using commodities -including the pollution costs associated with using energy. Raising the cost of the polluting fuel source X raises the overall cost of energy use and encourages a reduction in energy consumption. More precisely, consumers shift away from consuming energy to consuming other goods. This substitution is driven by the higher overall cost of energy. Subsidizing the clean substitute undermines this consumer substitution effect as it leads to a lower cost of energy overall. Consumers do not reduce energy consumption as much as they would under a cost-raising policy.
Second, subsidies that appear to be technologically neutral may not be neutral at all in the sense of equalizing the subsidy cost per unit of the activity that Congress is trying to discourage. Consider the tax credit for hybrid vehicles put in place in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. The credit ranges from zero to $3,000 per vehicle depending on whether the vehicle meets the specifi c hybrid criteria and on how many vehicles have been sold. The credit phases out as the vehicle hits certain sales targets over time. Table 2 shows the subsidy cost per gallon of gasoline saved through this credit for a number of vehicles. The tax credit is for model 2009 vehicles. Savings is measured relative to a vehicle that gets 20 miles per gallon, assuming the vehicle is driven the current average number of miles by private vehicles in the United States.
The table illustrates several points. First, the tax credit per gallon of gasoline saved varies from zero to over $11 per gallon. Second, certain hybrid vehicles that get high mileage are excluded from the credit because they have been successful in the market place. Third, certain high mileage vehicles are excluded from the subsidy because they do not use specifi ed technology. Note that the Corolla gets nearly the same mileage as the Tribute Hybrid. This is the most egregious violation of technology neutrality. The tax credit provides no incentive to tinker with the internal combustion engine to achieve increases in vehicle effi ciency despite the many opportunities that exist to make the internal combustion engine more effi cient. Our tax policy should provide the same incentives to improve mileage regardless of the technology put in place. Only in this way is true technology neutrality achieved.
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The hybrid vehicle tax credit is a clear example of inefficient allocation of resources across fuel saving capital investments. It is not the only example, however. Ineffi cient allocations can occur even when policies appear to be technology neutral. Consider the production tax credit for electricity generated from renewable sources. Currently the tax credit is worth 2.1 cents per kWh for electricity over the fi rst ten years of the plant's life.
13 This policy appears to be technology neutral (assuming all renewable technologies are made eligible for the credit). Renewable in this context means carbon-free. Table 3 compares the production tax credit for wind and geothermal energy. The subsidy per ton of carbon dioxide avoided critically depends on which power source is displaced by the new renewable capacity addition. Geothermal power, for example, has a capacity factor of over 70 percent-meaning that it is producing power on average for 70 percent of the year-while wind's capacity factor is less than 30 percent.
14 Geothermal power is more likely to displace base load coal units than natural gas while the opposite is true for wind. Under the assumptions that geothermal displaces coal and wind displaces natural gas, the subsidy for the former is $7.74 per ton of carbon dioxide avoided, while the subsidy 12 Others have noted the inconsistent treatment of different vehicles and provided calculations similar to those in Table 2 , including Sullivan (2009) and Joint Committee on Taxation (2009). 13 As noted above, certain sources (e.g., municipal solid waste and open loop biomass) are eligible for a tax credit at half this rate. 14 The capacity factor for wind depends importantly on location and turbine design. Capacity factors as high as 40 percent are not out of the question. But even at higher capacity factors, the point of this example is unaffected. The capacity factor cited in this table is the average over all existing and operating wind facilities in the United States.
for wind is $12.28 per ton. The difference arises because coal emits on average one ton of CO 2 per megawatt hour (MWh) of electricity generation, while natural gas emits on average roughly two-thirds of a ton of CO 2 per MWh. The point is not whether geothermal displaces coal and wind displaces natural gas (or even whether the displaced fuel is constant over time). Rather the point is that a technology neutral policy focused on reducing greenhouse gas emissions should favor technologies that are more likely to displace coal than natural gas. The current new technology credits do not take this into account.
A related point is the lack of transparency in a subsidy-based policy. It is diffi cult to identify the cost per ton of CO 2 displaced with either of the policies discussed above. The current proposal for a "cash for clunkers" program also illustrates this point. A recent paper by Davis and Kahn (2008) suggests that the cars most likely to be candidates for a cash-for-clunkers program would have emitted about 47 tons of CO 2 over their remaining life had they not been scrapped. At a cost of $2,500 the cash-for-clunkers program costs over $50 per ton of CO 2 saved. Once one factors in the possibility that very old cars that have been already taken off the road but not scrapped are brought in for the payment, the cost per ton rises dramatically. The current House of Representatives' cash-for-clunkers proposal will provide vouchers for $3,500 or $4,500 depending on the mileage difference between a traded in vehicle and its replacement (Herszenhorn, 2009 ). The cost of saving a ton of carbon dioxide gets obscured in the details of the program.
In summary, the current set of subsidies to encourage reductions in petroleum consumption and greenhouse gas emissions has two drawbacks. First, they generate a distortion on the margin between energy consumption and consumption of other non-energy commodities. Second, they generate distortions among the externality-reducing technologies in a way that raises the cost of achieving policy goals while doing so in a fairly opaque way.
In addition to the pricing issues discussed above, the current set of energy tax initiatives has other issues that could fruitfully be addressed by lawmakers. The fi rst issue is the stability and clarity of the policies. The historic pattern of two-year authorization cycles for production tax credits has created great uncertainty in the wind industry and led to boom and bust cycles that raise the cost of renewable energy investment. Greater certainty over the production tax credit would smooth out investment and reduce bottlenecks in turbine manufacturing that delay projects and raise costs. A related issue is the ability to use tax benefi ts. One casualty of the current fi nancial crisis is the reduced tax sensitivity of fi rms that historically have invested in wind and other renewable energy projects. The provision of the cash rebate option in ARRA addresses this concern.
A second key design issue is that of additionality. Does the policy lead to incremental reductions in pollution or simply subsidize emission-reducing activities that would have occurred in the absence of the policy? A good example of this is the $0.50 per gallon alternative fuels mixture credit. This credit is intended to encourage the addition of biodiesel and other biomass-based fuels to petroleum to reduce petroleum use. Recently it has emerged that many paper fi rms are taking the credit for mixing diesel fuel with black liquor, a biomass by-product of paper making that historically has been used by the industry as a fuel source for their boilers. Controversy has arisen over whether paper fi rms are adding diesel fuel to black liquor purely for the purpose of claiming the biodiesel mixture tax credit, as noted in Mouawad and Krauss (2009) . This is troubling on two levels. First, it may be highly ineffi cient if credits are being provided for inframarginal activities. This is a common problem with any subsidy. We want to provide the incentive to fi rms that would not have undertaken the desirable activity in the absence of the subsidy. But we do not want to provide the subsidy to fi rms that would have undertaken the activity regardless of the subsidy. The example from the paper industry is troubling beyond the inframarginal nature of the subsidy. If the tax credit is raising the demand for diesel fuel in order to make the biofuel eligible for the credit, then it is having the perverse effect of raising, rather than lowering, demand for petroleum products.
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A third important design issue is the interaction between tax policy and other policies. A simple example of this problem is the interaction of the hybrid vehicle tax credit and the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards. Allowing tax credits for hybrids encourages the production and purchase of high mileage vehicles. But CAFE sets minimum fl eet mileage standards for automakers. Producing more hybrid vehicles relaxes the CAFE mileage constraint for automakers and allows them to sell more low mileage vehicles. One possible policy response to this would be to exclude credit-receiving hybrids from the fl eet for purposes of meeting CAFE standards. Alternatively, one could eliminate the credit and simply let CAFE be the incentive for hybrid and high mileage vehicle production.
Two other examples illustrate the unintended consequences of policy interaction. 
TAXES VERSUS SUBSIDIES
Most if not all of the problems identifi ed in the previous section disappear if 15 The perverse impact of policy is not limited to the biodiesel mixing tax credit. Research by Holland, Hughes and Knittel (2009) suggests that low carbon fuel standards may have the perverse effect of increasing net carbon emissions. 16 An RPS program mandates a minimum percentage of electricity that must be produced from renewable sources.
the current system of tax subsidies for carbon free technologies is replaced with taxes on fossil fuels. In this section, I begin by assessing the "carbon tax equivalent" for production tax credits using a levelized cost framework. 17 The levelized cost of an electricity generating project is the constant amount of revenue per kilowatt hour required to cover all the costs of an investment project (including returns to equity investors).
I compare the levelized cost of an advanced combustion turbine for gas with a wind project under the assumption that wind and natural gas are competing fuel sources at the margin. If investors are choosing between these two technologies on the basis of levelized cost, then I consider what tax incentives are required to make wind competitive with natural gas. A number of factors affect the relative cost of wind and natural gas powered generators. In this paper, I focus on two of these factors: the cost of natural gas and the relative capital cost escalation for wind to gas. Figure 1 shows how natural gas prices in 2009 dollars per thousand cubic feet (MCF) paid by electric utilities have fl uctuated over the past seven years. In particular, natural gas prices hit a (nominal) peak in June 2008 but since then have fallen by nearly fi fty percent. The decline in gas prices makes wind that much less competitive against natural gas generation.
The other factor that influences the relative cost of wind and natural gas is capital costs. Based on data from the Energy Information Administration's (EIA) Annual Energy Outlook, the capital costs of wind are nearly three times that of gas. Wiser and Bolinger (2008) document rising construction costs for recent wind projects with increasing turbine costs playing a signifi cant role. It may be that future cost increases are comparable to those of gas (or perhaps even less), but wind is disadvantaged to the extent that its capital costs rise at a more rapid rate than that of its competitors.
Based on the technology and economic assumptions detailed in the appendix, the levelized cost of a wind project is two percent lower than that for natural gas fi red 17 See Metcalf (2007) for a discussion of this methodology. Jan. 2003 Jan. 2004 Jan. 2005 Jan. 2006 Jan. 2007 Jan. 2008 Jan. 2009 electricity in the absence of the production tax credit. 18 This suggests that at current prices the production tax credit for new wind projects is inframarginal. Table 4 reports the production tax credit required to ensure that the levelized cost of wind is no higher than that of natural gas for different gas price and wind capital cost assumptions. The capital cost escalation factor is the amount by which the wind overnight cost is assumed to increase over the base value assumed in the appendix.
Based on the economic and technology assumptions contained in the appendix, Table 4 shows that the current production tax credit is suffi cient to make wind cost competitive with natural gas at a fuel cost of $6 per MCF and a cost escalation for wind capital costs of 25 percent. Given the current capital costs assumed in EIA's Annual Energy Outlook, natural gas prices would have to fall below $5 per MCF before a production tax credit of 2.1 cents per kWh would be required. In other words, it appears that the production tax credit is an inframarginal subsidy under current economic conditions. Given the problems with using subsidies to support low-carbon energy production, a natural question is what carbon tax would be required to obtain the same result as shown in Table 4 with production tax credits. Table 5 presents that information.
One striking fact about Table 5 in comparison to Table 4 is the magnitude of the carbon tax required to equalize the levelized costs of both technologies. Moreover, Table 5 indicates that a carbon tax of $45 per metric ton of CO 2 is comparable to the current production tax credit of $0.021 per kWh. The high carbon price required to be equivalent in impact to the production tax credit simply refl ects the fact that wind in this model is replacing a relatively low-carbon fuel (relative to coal). A carbon tax of only $25 is comparable to a $0.021 Author's calculations. Entries are production tax credits in dollars per kWh that reduce the levelized cost of wind to that of natural gas. Natural gas prices are reported in dollars per thousand cubic feet (MCF). 18 The levelized cost of wind is 8 percent higher if no production tax credit is allowed and the asset is written off over 15 years instead of fi ve. Entries are carbon tax rates in dollars per ton of CO 2 that raise the levelized cost of natural gas to that of wind. Natural gas prices are reported in dollars per thousand cubic feet (MCF).
per kWh production tax credit for wind if wind is substituting for coal.
In the previous section it was argued that a technology neutral subsidy for lowcarbon energy would take into account the carbon content of the fuel that it displaced. If the purpose of a production tax credit is simply to make wind cost competitive with fossil fuel power sources, it should take into account the profi tability of the wind project. The higher the capacity factor of the project, ceteris paribus, the more profi table the project. Table 6 reports capacity factors for wind projects installed in 2006 averaged across regions of the country. If the focus is on cost competitiveness, Table 6 suggests that the production tax credit should be highest in New England and lowest in the Midwest of the United States. This is not meant to suggest that the United States should implement this policy but rather to illustrate the confused policy objectives behind this particular energy tax subsidy.
What would a price-based approach look like? The two competing options are cap-and-trade programs and carbon taxes. Political momentum favors the former approach while ease of administration and efficiency favors the latter. The interested reader is referred to Metcalf and Weisbach (forthcoming) for details on how a carbon tax could be implemented. Many of the design considerations also apply to cap-and-trade programs.
It is worth noting one argument against carbon taxes often raised by environmentalists: that a cap-and-trade program provides certainty in the environmental outcome while the carbon tax does not. 19 Metcalf (2009a) describes a carbon tax that meets long-term emission targets while providing the price certainty advantages of a tax. The Responsive Emissions Autonomous Carbon Tax (REACT) sets an initial tax rate at the beginning of the control period (say, 2012) and increases the tax at a standard rate of four percent plus infl ation. In benchmark years (perhaps every fi ve years) cumulative emissions since the beginning of the control period are compared to a target cumulative emissions goal for that year. If cumulative emissions exceed the target in the benchmark year, the tax is increased at a "catch-up" rate of 10 percent plus infl ation until the next benchmark year. If cumulative emissions in that year are below the target, the tax increases at the standard rate. If not, it continues to increase at the higher catch-up rate.
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This policy approach ensures that longrun targets are met while price stability is achieved in the short run. Given the ability to predict emissions in the short run and the transparent nature of the tax, fi rms would be able to predict with considerable certainty the growth rate of the tax in the near term, thereby providing greater clarity for their planning purposes. The REACT approach addresses the objection that a carbon tax does not ensure a hard cap on greenhouse gas emissions over the control period. An overall cap can be maintained while insulating consumers and businesses from short-run fl uctua- 19 See, for example, the posting by Wagner and Keohane (2009) Wiser and Bolinger (2008) tions in carbon prices that add volatility to energy prices and undermine support for climate change legislation. It does this with a transparent mechanism for adjusting the price of emissions over the control period.
CONCLUSION
The current tax code relies on a large number of subsidies such as accelerated depreciation, tax exemptions, production credits and investment credits to support low-carbon technologies. This approach is fl awed on a number of levels. First, it lowers the price of consuming energy relative to other goods. Second, the subsidies are not cost effective, in that they do not equalize the subsidy cost per ton of CO 2 that is not emitted. Third, to the extent that the subsidy is inframarginal, it raises the cost to the federal government of achieving its policy objectives. Finally, the interaction of subsidies with other state and federal policies may undermine the effectiveness of the subsidy or drive up the cost of the program.
An approach that improves economic efficiency is a market-based approach such as a cap-and-trade system or a carbon tax. The Responsive Emissions Autonomous Carbon Tax is one approach to implementing a carbon tax that addresses the concern that a tax-based approach does not guarantee that emission goals are achieved.
If the United States implements a carbon tax, an important question will be whether it preserves or eliminates the various subsidies to low-carbon fuels that are in the tax code. It is diffi cult to make a case for preserving them if carbon pricing comes into effect. where T is the number of years that the plant operates, k is the number of years that it takes to construct the plant, C t is the annual cash outlays of the project and Tax t is the annual tax (net of any tax benefi ts). All values are in real terms and r is the real discount rate used by the fi rm.
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In step 2, the annual required revenue is converted to a cost per kWh (c) as follows:
[2] c R = ⋅ ⋅ 365 24 φ where φ is the capacity factor for the project (the percentage of time the project is on-line 21 A constant discount rate is used over the project's life. I calculate the net present value as if the project were all equity fi nanced but include the tax benefi ts of debt (deductions for interest paid). This allows me to use a constant discount rate despite the changing debt-equity ratio of the project as debt is paid down. See Brealey and Myers (1981) for a complete treatment of project discounting. Table A1 presents the economic assumptions used in the analysis. The nominal bond rate is based on the fi fty-year average of Baa bond yields as reported in the 2009 Economic Report of the President. The average state corporate tax rate is taken from Ernst & Young (2007) . Table A2 gives the assumed technology and cost assumptions for wind and natural gas projects.
The capacity factor for wind is based on the capacity factor for new wind projects as documented in Wiser and Bolinger (2008) . Other assumptions are taken from the Electricity Market Module of Energy Information Administration (2009). For a discussion of the tax treatment of energy investment, see Metcalf (2009b) . 
